Sorry, no
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| Author | Content |
|---|---|
| caitlynm Mar 03, 2016 5:36 PM EDT |
Terrorism doesn't require technical sophistication. |
| dotmatrix Mar 03, 2016 6:17 PM EDT |
I think the point of that particular statement is: "The 'bad' guys are gonna use the best encryption they can find. So, making the general users' encryption less secure is not going to affect the 'bad' guys at all." This particular statement is true. The current context of the argument is false -- i.e. the Apple controversy. I strongly agree with keeping encryption strong with zero government 'backdoors'. However, I strongly disagree that manufacturers of communication devices and communication providers should not help the government as much as possible when presented with a legal and reasonable warrant. These two ideas are not mutually exclusive, as much as Apple et al try to drum that into public thought. So -- after a long prelude... Terrorism certainly doesn't require technical sophistication and no one seems to have claimed that to be so. However, technically sophisticated terrorism does exist and will not be prevented through 'weakened' publicly used encryption. But... if a given technically sophisticated terrorist knows that a given platform is searchable with corporate help and a valid warrant -- that raises the knowledge bar for that terrorist... he/she must seek out other methods and platforms. Of course, a custom platform can be cheaply made too... |
| flufferbeer Mar 04, 2016 5:26 AM EDT |
@domatrix > if a given technically sophisticated terrorist knows that a given platform is searchable with corporate help and a valid warrant -- that raises the knowledge bar for that terrorist... he/she must seek out other methods and platforms. Seems to me that you could substitute Blackhat Cracker for "terrorist" and you'd have a majorpoint. Though most of the rest of the statement seems more like back-and-forth Uncertainty and Doubt (the UD part of FUD, btw...) 2c |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 9:32 AM EDT |
>Seems to me that you could substitute Blackhat Cracker for "terrorist" This is actually the reverse of the point. It doesn't take very much knowledge to employ strong encryption for both data at rest and data in transit. ISIS has already been reported to have hired technical individuals to assist them in creating strongly encrypted communication systems. >Though most of the rest of the statement seems more like back-and-forth Uncertainty and Doubt (the UD part of FUD, btw...) I'm *not* sure what you mean. There's no back and forth in my statement at all -- and no FUD or even any UD. ******* I suppose I'll propose a question: If someone who was a close friend or family member was murdered. And a key piece of evidence was locked in a bank vault. And the bank vault lock had a 6 digit combination pin which could only be entered if someone inserted a specially made key into the system first...
And yes... this is precisely the same scenario as the Apple controversy. Apple and other 'experts' are spreading FUD... and it's disgraceful... and I am personally disgusted by it. ******EDITED: forgot a critical 'not' |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 11:46 AM EDT |
> And yes... this is precisely the same scenario as the Apple controversy. No, it isn't: (1) Apple doesn't have an already made key. If they did the court could demand it and Apple would have to provide it. They have to make a key, and it's a general purpose key which can be demanded ever thereafter. (2) There is no murderer to catch. The murders are already dead. And the government was complicit in their being in the country to perform the murders. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 11:49 AM EDT |
>(1) Apple doesn't have an already made key. If they did the court could demand it and Apple would have to provide it. They have to make a key, and it's a general purpose key which can be demanded ever thereafter. Yes they do... Here it is: https://developer.apple.com/library/mac/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/Introduction/Introduction.html >(2) There is no murderer to catch. The murders are already dead. And the government was complicit in their being in the country to perform the murders. OK... yeah. FUD and misleading. ********** I understand the desire to take Apple's side, especially in light of Snowden. However, the Snowden issue is not applicable here... and is not part of the legitimate discussion regarding this particular case. ***EDIT: Here's a better document to figure out what is going on: https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf Take a good look at the diagram on page 4. You will see something called "Apple Root Cert" ... this is the premade Apple key. The root cert is the start (or end depending on how you look at it) of the 'trust' within the iPhone. This root cert is Apple's 'backdoor' into your iPhone. It already exists and is used by Apple with every update of the phone. There is no FBI request for a 'master key' into every iPhone. This is wrong. This is misleading. This is FUD. The FBI request is precisely this:
Gov: Write a four lines 'for' loop to count to 999999 and try each number. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 12:05 PM EDT |
> Yes they do... Here it is: That's not the key. That's the tool for signing the key so that it will work. > OK... yeah. FUD and misleading. Well, that's your opinion. > I understand the desire to take Apple's side... I'm not taking Apple's side. I'm opposing the government's side. The fact that Apple happens to be their target is entirely beside the point. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 12:13 PM EDT |
> Apple: Make the changes. And that's the sticking point. If Apple simply didn't want to comply, all they would have to do is make a small "mistake" in the code and the phone would then be wiped. And there's no way the government could ever prove they did so deliberately. Instead they're taking a stand on principle. You simply don't agree with that stand. But arguing such matters is what the court system is for. It'll be settled there, not by any debates here.. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 12:15 PM EDT |
@jdixon: Here...  the red X is not a component of the iPhone 5. The red circle is the trust root installed on every iPhone. It is used by Apple to ensure that only Apple signed firmware will boot. This is the premade key... and the only key that is being asked to be used by Apple. The key for the user data is 'higher' up in the diagram. This key is created on the phone itself and never leaves the phone. In other words... there is no 'master key' for user data... it doesn't exist and there has not been a request to magically call such a 'master key' into existence. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 12:22 PM EDT |
> Here... When you want to argue in good faith, get back to me. The "key" you were talking about above is the coding changes the government wants Apple to make, not the signing key that verifies the changes. And that's what Apple is refusing to do. They'll sign any code the government provides to them. They're just refusing to make it for them. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 12:27 PM EDT |
>When you want to argue in good faith, get back to me. Always have been. >The "key" you were talking about above is the coding changes the government wants Apple to make, not the signing key that verifies the changes. This is technically incorrect. The certificate on the phone has a public key. Apple has the private key, which is the other half of the whole key. So when speaking of split keys... there are two. And it only makes sense when you consider both. In any case, the argument boils down to: -Can the government force Apple to make the change? And the legal answer is clearly, Yes. In order for the legal answer to be No... new law must be made either via the court or Congress. Clearly Apple sees that they will lose in court, which is why they have been sitting in Congress recently. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 1:18 PM EDT |
> This is technically incorrect. Like I said, when you're ready to argue in good fatih... > And the legal answer is clearly, Yes. Again, your opinion. Apple disagrees. In any case, the law and reality don't always align. You can force a person to do a something by pointing a gun at them. You can't force them to think what you want. And making code changes requires thinking. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 1:33 PM EDT |
>>This is technically incorrect. >Like I said, when you're ready to argue in good fatih... OK... Here I will quote precisely from Apple's own security documentation: Apple iOS Security Guide, Page #5 wrote:The Boot ROM code contains the Apple Root CA public key, which is used to verify that the Low-Level Bootloader (LLB) is signed by Apple before allowing it to load. This is the first step in the chain of trust where each step ensures that the next is signed by Apple. When the LLB finishes its tasks, it verifies and runs the next-stage bootloader, iBoot, which in turn verifies and runs the iOS kernel. |
| BernardSwiss Mar 04, 2016 3:15 PM EDT |
> I suppose I'll propose a question: > If someone who was a close friend or family member was murdered... Apple’s new ally in unlocking battle: A man whose wife was shot 3 times in attack http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/03/apples-new-ally-i... |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 3:24 PM EDT |
> Here I will quote precisely from Apple's own security documentation: All of which involves signing and running the code they would have to write. The signing isn't the key, the code is. Pretending otherwise isn't arguing in good faith. Apple will happily sign and run any code the government provides to them. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 4:14 PM EDT |
>All of which involves signing and running the code they would have to write. Oh come on man! You really believe that this 'unwritten code' is much more in-depth than what I wrote in the other thread: http://lxer.com/module/forums/t/36121/ If you want... I'll create a cryptographic trust chain simulating Apple's... and post the code here and include a tty capture of an actively running version using ttyrec and ttyplay. http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/lucid/man1/ttyrec.1.html Now... that may take me a few days - but I'd do it if it would shine some light here. The whole Apple controversy is just utter nonsense at almost every turn. Furthermore: There is no possibility of Apple creating a 'master key' to unlock everyone's iPhone user data. The user data cryptokey is mathematical tied to a given phone's hardware. There can not be a master key -- it is simply not possible to create this mystical thing. |
| penguinist Mar 04, 2016 5:17 PM EDT |
So, if I understand this, the US government is asking that a piece of software that they wrote be signed by the key which Apple uses for the purpose of loading arbitrary software on the Apple products. I don't know if this code is open for Apple and others to inspect or if it is a closed blank check giving its authors unfettered access to the devices on which it is loaded. Do we know those details? Here are my thoughts in a nutshell: 1. Protecting the integrity of my own data, and my right to personal privacy is a hot-button issue for me. It's really a core-value for me. This is one of the reasons that I love Linux so much, because with it I can craft protections for my own private data that are verifiably secure. 2. We (at least I) lost trust in our US government since the Snowden revelations. We learned that we cannot trust the US government to do the right thing. Without apology the US government continued/continues its covert activities directed en-mass against all citizens of the world including its own. 3. In the case of Apple vs. US government, we have a demand to facilitate access to someone's private data. I understand the value of court issued "search warrants" to collect evidence to prosecute criminals, and it might be that the US government is being totally open with us on this and that there is no hidden agenda here. But, are we totally certain that the demand on Apple is not a red herring or a way to set a precedent. I don't know one way or the other, but that leads me to point 4: 4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate. |
| JaseP Mar 04, 2016 6:01 PM EDT |
Quoting:-Can the government force Apple to make the change? Unless I missed a key ruling on the matter, the legal answer is most certainly NOT yes. No new law is needed. The 1st, 4th & 5th Amendments trump any law passed by Congress, including the All Writs Act. And as far as I'm aware, at least one jurist has ruled that in this instance the All Writs Act would violate Constitutional guarantees... So,... Nope,... Not even close. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 6:04 PM EDT |
>So, if I understand this, the US government is asking that a piece of software that they wrote be signed by the key which Apple uses for the purpose of loading arbitrary software on the Apple products. No... The US government is asking Apple to modify its own software and then sign that software and then install that software. The changes to the software are very very minor -- or should be. The software requested to be changed has not been written or inspected by the government... and the government is not asking for the source code or even a copy of the compiled code in unsigned or portable form. And the software is not Open Source... neither 'Free and' nor just plain. The signing of the new changed software is explicitly and cryptographically tied to this particular phone and Apple is the only party who can write the code and also the only party who can sign the code and also the only party who install the code. The argument that Apple is being requested to provide a universally applicable 'backdoor' into all iPhones is completely false. This is easy to understand if you read through the posted Apple written iOS security documentation. The US government's argument is that the "All Writs" law applies to the requested action of Apple modifying the code because they are no other statutes governing this particular request. BTW: The "All Writs" law was signed by George Washington... which means he and the rest of the 'founders' understood that not everything will be included in the statues and there needs to be a method of addressing the lack of current law around a given situation.... which also necessarily makes all those little historical quotes regarding "Freedom from... or for..." complete nonsense because clearly the founding persons understood that laws were necessary and that the government will need the power of "search and seizure" even in unknown and unconsidered situations. >4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate. I generally agree with this point. However, the sheer amount of misinformation, misunderstanding, and plain FUD around this is simply astounding. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 6:14 PM EDT |
> You really believe that this 'unwritten code' is much more in-depth than what I wrote in the other thread: I don't care one way or another how complex the code is. But if it's that simple there's no need to ask Apple to write it. > The argument that Apple is being requested to provide a universally applicable 'backdoor' into all iPhones is completely false. The code could be used on any iPhone. It would have to be signed each time, but that's the only requirement. And once it exists, it would be. > So, if I understand this, the US government is asking that a piece of software that they wrote be signed by the key which Apple uses for the purpose of loading arbitrary software on the Apple products. No. They're asking Apple to write the software for them. |
| JaseP Mar 04, 2016 6:22 PM EDT |
Quoting: BTW: The "All Writs" law was signed by George Washington... which means he and the rest of the 'founders' understood that not everything will be included in the statues and there needs to be a method of addressing the lack of current law around a given situation.... which also necessarily makes all those little historical quotes regarding "Freedom from... or for..." complete nonsense because clearly the founding persons understood that laws were necessary and that the government will need the power of "search and seizure" even in unknown and unconsidered situations. Doesn't mean that in the slightest. A person (even a founding father) is perfectly capable of acting in the most noble cause in one moment and then betraying that cause in the next. And Washington, despite being a generally (excuse the pun) very honorable man, was a man nonetheless and on occasion acted dishonorably (the Whiskey Rebellion comes to mind). That the All Writs Act was passed by some of the same men who framed the Bill of Rights, means nothing about its Constitutionality. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 6:42 PM EDT |
>That the All Writs Act was passed by some of the same men who framed the Bill of Rights, means nothing about its Constitutionality. True... However, SCOTUS has already included All Writs in an opinion: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Writs_Act wikipedia wrote:The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in United States v. New York Telephone Co. 434 U.S. 159 (1977) that the act provided authority for a U.S. District Court to order a telephone company to assist law enforcement officials in installing a device on a rotary phone in order to track the phone numbers dialed on that phone, which was reasonably believed to be used in furtherance of criminal activity. Therefore, as I've written in prior threads... in order for Apple to have a favorable SCOTUS opinion, the above case must also be reviewed and the prior ruling found incorrect. Or... find that All Writs does not apply for some reason. Apple's legal argument, as far as I can tell, is that All Writs does not apply -- and not that All Writs is unconstitutional. In any case... I repeat in big bold letters: dotmatrix wrote:There is no FBI request for a 'master key' to decrypt everyone's iPhone. In fact, this is not mathematical possible. |
| JaseP Mar 04, 2016 6:49 PM EDT |
Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional... And requiring a company to write software and cryptographically sign it is not the same as providing assistance in installing a wiretap on a single (mostly mechanical) device... It's an order of magnitude, if not several, more ominous. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 7:01 PM EDT |
>Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional... Wrong wording. The All Writs Act is either Constitutional or not, the appropriateness of its application is not governed by its Constitutionality. >And requiring a company to write software and cryptographically sign it is not the same as providing assistance in installing a wiretap on a single (mostly mechanical) device... It's an order of magnitude, if not several, more ominous. I disagree and so does the government. The 'assistance' has nothing whatsoever to do with the product in question. All Writs could apply to any sort of evidence gathering warrant. Apple's argument does not address All Writs as an inappropriate legal tool for assistance in writing software... instead they have argued that CALEA applies rather than All Writs. This is not because All Writs is 'wrong' or not applicable -- it's because Congress may have written a statute governing this type of assistance. The argument here is much more subtle than it seems... Apple is making a lot of public noise as a distraction -- but the legal argument, when looked at dispassionately, is quite sound for the government's case. |
| flufferbeer Mar 04, 2016 7:11 PM EDT |
@penguinsit >> 3. In the case of Apple vs. US government, we have a demand to facilitate access to someone's private data. I understand the value of court issued "search warrants" to collect evidence to prosecute criminals, and it might be that the US government is being totally open with us on this and that there is no hidden agenda here. But, are we totally certain that the demand on Apple is not a red herring or a way to set a precedent. I don't know one way or the other, but that leads me to point 4: 4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate.<< Right on! Iwouldn't so easily accomodate the US government to automatically volunteer-over to them private citizen information. Besides once you go along with so-called "temporary expediencies" to hand over the Keys to the Kingdom, you ain't NEVER getting 'em back! @jdixon jd: >Like I said, when you're ready to argue in good fatih... dm: >> And the legal answer is clearly, Yes. jd: > Again, your opinion. Apple disagrees. While naturally dm will DENY this, it seems to me that dm is LESS DISINTERSTED in the outcome of Apple's compliance with the goverment's demands then he/she will care to admit. In other words, you're likely to hit a wall from all of your anti-government technical code arguments with whatever ulterior motives dm has in continuing this thread (no question UNsympathetic to Apple Inc!) 2 more c's waiting for dm's insistent and FUD-laden denials any second now...... |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 7:19 PM EDT |
>to hand over the Keys to the Kingdom, you ain't NEVER getting 'em back! There are no keys to the kingdom. Apple iOS security guide wrote:The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing. No software or firmware can read them directly; they can see only the results of encryption or decryption operations performed by dedicated AES engines implemented in silicon using the UID or GID as a key. Additionally, the Secure Enclave’s UID and GID can only be used by the AES engine dedicated to the Secure Enclave. The UIDs are unique to each device and are not recorded by Apple or any of its suppliers. The GIDs are common to all processors in a class of devices (for example, all devices using the Apple A8 processor), and are used for non security-critical tasks such as when delivering system software during installation and restore. Integrating these keys into the silicon helps prevent them from being tampered with or bypassed, or accessed outside the AES engine. The UIDs and GIDs are also not available via JTAG or other debugging interfaces. Means... There is no master key to access user data. And there is no possible master key to access user data. In fact the only way to access user data is to guess the correct passcode. This is true even with Apple's help... And... Apple can guess... The 'backdoor' is already there... and Apple owns it and can open it at its own pleasure for passcode guessing fun for its own purposes... all without your knowledge. Apple will never close this already existing 'backdoor', because this already existing 'backdoor' is necessary in order to update iOS. So, if the government wanted to hide what it was doing... it would have served Apple with a secret warrant from the secret court and issued a gag order with stiff fines... and we wouldn't be having this discussion because no one would know. |
| BernardSwiss Mar 04, 2016 7:34 PM EDT |
My understanding is that the requested change is a new firmware, that disables certain protective measures (escalating time delay, and "self-destruct after 10 wrong attempts" option) so that the FBI can brute-force the PIN. I'd call that a "back-door" (if you don't like that terminology, call it a "back-gate" that allows the breaker access and opportunity to brute-force the back door). At this point, arguing about the rest of it is sophistic quibbling. that simply sweeps the remaining considerations under the carpet and declares them to be non-existent. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 8:04 PM EDT |
>> Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional... > Wrong wording. The All Writs Act is either Constitutional or not, the appropriateness of its application is not governed by its Constitutionality. See what I mean about good faith? Dotmatrix is simply restating JaseP's objection in different words and then claiming the original statement is invalid. > The 'backdoor' is already there... and Apple owns it and can open it at its own pleasure for passcode guessing fun for its own purposes... all without your knowledge. OK. For the benefit of others reading, yes Apple can sign updates to your OS. And that's what the government is requesting. That Apple create a special update to the OS that will allow as many guesses as necessary to get the password for this device. They have taken the extra step of requesting that it only be signed to be valid on this deivice. They want Apple to sign that software so that it will run on this device, install, and run it. Simple enough, right? But... the special update Apple is being asked to create will be also usable on any device running the same OS, once it's signed appropriately for the device. Anyone who claims this won't open the floodgates for further such requests is delusional or has an ulterior motive. Dotmatrix is (deliberately as far as I can tell) using the word key for both the software patch and the encryption signature used for signing of that patch, and then arguing the key already exists. The encryption signing signature (key) does, but the software patch does not. Both are necessary to unlock the device. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 8:23 PM EDT |
>They have taken the extra step of requesting that it only be signed to be valid on this deivice. This is wrong. Apple can only sign per device. Each update for each device needs to be signed individually. And Apple has the key and the only key which makes this possible. So it's not per government request -- it's per Apple's architectural design that one and only one device is being loaded with modified firmware. In order to gain passcode guessing access to other phones, the government would need a warrant for each phone. >the special update Apple is being asked to create will be also usable on any device running the same OS, once it's signed appropriately for the device. Correct. But Apple holds the key. And in order for the government to force Apple to individually sign the 'new' firmware, the government would need a new warrant -- for that device and only for that device. >Dotmatrix is (deliberately as far as I can tell) using the word key for both the software patch and the encryption signature used for signing of that patch, and then arguing the key already exists. The encryption signing signature (key) does, but the software patch does not. Both are necessary to unlock the device. No. There are multiple keys. There is the Apple CA root public key being used as the trust root. This key enables Apple to update its phones and ensure app signing is correct. There is another key which is generated on the phone. This second key is used to encrypt user data. When you enter the passcode, this second key is used to decrypt the user data. Apple does not have this second key -- it never leaves the phone and is mathematically tied to the specific device via the UID... see prior post. There are other keys too... but those keys are not necessary for the current discussion. So, neither the government nor Apple has or will have or can have direct immediate access to any particular iPhone's user data. The only key that the Government is asking Apple to use is its private key associated with the public key which has been inserted by Apple at manufacture time as a trust root for iOS system file [not user data] access. |
| penguinist Mar 04, 2016 8:29 PM EDT |
Ok so it is clarified that the signed software runs on a phone that identifies itself with a particular ID. I wonder how these device IDs are programmed. I don't know, maybe someone here does. Perhaps an ID code is placed in a flash memory location or in an fpga at the time of manufacturing. Now imagine what you could do with a little equipment. Nothing exotic, just a soldering station, a flash or fpga programmer. Things that I actually have myself over there in the hardware corner. Maybe I could get some consulting work here. Does anyone need an iDevice ID changed? I would imagine that our government labs are orders of magnitude more sophisticated than my basic hardware corner. Leading me back to these points: 2. We (at least I) lost trust in our US government since the Snowden revelations. 4. With all due respect, a healthy amount of critical skepticism is quite appropriate. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 8:43 PM EDT |
> I wonder how these device IDs are programmed. I don't know, maybe someone here does. Perhaps an ID code is placed in a flash memory location or in an fpga at the time of manufacturing. I already posted this: Quoting:The device’s unique ID (UID) and a device group ID (GID) are AES 256-bit keys fused (UID) or compiled (GID) into the application processor and Secure Enclave during manufacturing. The portion of the circuitry where the UID and GID are stored is one time writable. Once the key is 'burned' into the chip, it's unchangeable. The electronic circuit element is referred to a fuse... thus the language 'fused' in the Apple security document. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programmable_read-only_memory ADD: >Now imagine what you could do with a little equipment. Nothing exotic, just a soldering station, a flash or fpga programmer. Things that I actually have myself over there in the hardware corner. Maybe I could get some consulting work here. Does anyone need an iDevice ID changed? I would imagine that our government labs are orders of magnitude more sophisticated than my basic hardware corner. You can't change the UID or the GID. You can swap the chip set, but if you do a swap, you will have thrown away the user data encryption trust root and thus the user data will remain forever encrypted. |
| JaseP Mar 04, 2016 8:44 PM EDT |
Quoting: >Just because one request made under the All Writs Act was found to be Constitutional, doesn't mean that all requests under the All Writs Act are Constitutional... Where did you get your law degree?!?! A law can very much be unconstitutional as applied. This is especially so of an act like the All Writs, which cuts a path pretty wide in the potential actions that the gov't can request. Look back at the Wiki that you cited... It produces a four prong test with regards to All Writs. Check out the fourth one... That very heavily will depend on what the gov't is asking someone to do. That is; one request may be wholly Constitutional, another not... As for the gov't agreeing with you,... Well the gov't thinks that is doesn't need a warrant in a whole lot of instances either. So what the gov't thinks doesn't mean diddly. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 8:48 PM EDT |
>A law can very much be unconstitutional as applied. Give an example... or it didn't happen. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 9:06 PM EDT |
> Give an example... or it didn't happen. Does the law say police have a right to question a suspect? Google Miranda ruling. |
| JaseP Mar 04, 2016 9:16 PM EDT |
Quoting:>A law can very much be unconstitutional as applied. I love it when non-lawyers, particular computer people (who typically see things as binary), try to argue law... Here's an article that might enlighten you a little bit... http://elsterlaw.com/facially-unconstitutional-unconstitutio... |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 9:19 PM EDT |
>>> Give an example... or it didn't happen. >Does the law say police have a right to question a suspect? Google Miranda ruling. If you have a law degree yourself, please teach me... I'm fully capable of reading, and would gladly appreciate a link to some case law regarding Constitutional laws which are labeled Unconstitutional when applied in a particular scenario. In the Miranda ruling the questioning a suspect was not found to be Unconstitutional rather Miranda is a balancing of two separate Constitutional rights which are seemingly at odds with one another. However... IANAL... and am using the language in the best way I know how and understand. The logical argument for the government's case in the Apple controversy makes sense. The logical argument for Apple's refusal does not seem to make sense. However, I am an engineer, and am trained in both electronics and cryptography. And many of the basic claims made by many of the 'woe is us' crowd are just plain wrong, and show little to no understanding of the either the technical issues nor of the legal framework. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 9:21 PM EDT |
@JaseP: Thank you! It would help to post things like that upfront. Now I have some reading and learning to do... However, I don't believe the basic argument has changed. |
| dotmatrix Mar 04, 2016 9:34 PM EDT |
After reading the facial / as applied link... It would seem to me that since the All Writs Act already makes the distinction between existent and non-existent statutes, that it would be impossible to find it Unconstitutional as applied. If a statute exists, then the existent statute means the application of All Writs is incorrect -- but does that mean the same as "Unconstitutional as applied" ... I don't know. And it really doesn't matter for the argument. The courts will decide whether CALEA applies, and if it doesn't then certainly All Writs does apply because that's its role -- to apply where there is no statute. If CALEA applies then the courts will indicate that the government's application of All Writs has no merit... but again is that the same as "Unconstitutional as applied" ... and does it matter... since precedent will be formed anyway regardless of language. |
| jdixon Mar 04, 2016 10:59 PM EDT |
> ...and would gladly appreciate a link to some case law regarding Constitutional laws which are labeled Unconstitutional when applied in a particular scenario. No one has said the law is unconstitutional. Only that the application of the law could be. Exactly as JaseP said above. > In the Miranda ruling the questioning a suspect was not found to be Unconstitutional rather Miranda is a balancing of two separate Constitutional rights which are seemingly at odds with one another. That's sort of like saying a circle is not an ellipse because it only has one focus. The application of the questioning was found to violate the suspect's Constitutional right to not incriminate himself. > And it really doesn't matter for the argument. The courts will decide... Which is what I've been saying. Now, that doesn't mean I'll agree with their decision, but what I think and $5 will get a cup of coffee at Starbucks. |
| dotmatrix Mar 05, 2016 7:38 AM EDT |
>Which is what I've been saying. Now, that doesn't mean I'll agree with their decision, but what I think and $5 will get a cup of coffee at Starbucks. Agree with that too... However... dotmatrix wrote:There is no master key. And the FBI request is necessarily restricted to a singular phone on a singular warrant. And there is no such thing as a 'backdoor' which opens every iPhone's user data for LE inspection. The only possibility is a passcode guessing game. And this is necessarily limited to 80ms per guess. And the FBI has not requested any changes to this architecture, design, or policy. Any changes that would allow anything other than a pure brute force attack every 80ms would require new hardware on a new phone. So... while an individual can try to arm chair the CALEA v. All Writs decision point... the rest of the argument is utter nonsense. Also -- if you have an iPhone and are interested in keeping the user data secure, simply set a long alpha-numeric passcode and do not sync to the cloud... and your user data will remain protected regardless of the outcome of this case because no legal argument is going to magically change your current hardware and architecture. |
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